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When monetary policy is explicitly committed to maintaining price inflation 
targets, the scope for contra-cyclical fiscal policy is substantially reduced. 
While the automatic fiscal stabilizers continue to play an important role in 
reducing the sensitivity of the economy to shocks, discretionary fiscal policies 
have only a limited impact, because of induced monetary policy responses.
1 
Under these conditions, the analysis of fiscal policies should focus on their 
effects on the composition of aggregate demand and on the growth of 
potential output. For example, a policy to deliberately reduce the public debt 
would, through its interaction with monetary policy, stimulate investment and 
hence raise potential output growth. 
                                                             
An earlier version of this paper was released as a PEAP Policy Study (Mintz and 
Wilson, 2000a). The financial support provided by the Canadian Chamber of Commerce is 
gratefully acknowledged. The authors also thank their research associates, Duanjie Chen and 
Steve Murphy, who carried out the analysis underlying the tables in this report; and Erin Bell, 
who prepared the final version of the paper. 
1For a discussion of this issue see Fortin (2001, pp. 181-192). 
As Canada entered the new millennium, the federal government had 
achieved a budget surplus, and conditions appeared favourable for increasing 
potential surpluses (the “fiscal dividend” which is the amount available to the 
government that can be used for tax cuts or expenditure increases within the  
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framework of a balanced budget). Although the current growth recession will 
reduce the potential surplus somewhat, the medium-term outlook is for 
increasing surpluses. 
The allocation of these potential surpluses is the most important fiscal 
policy question today. Our view is that, from the standpoint of efficiency and 
productivity growth, priority should be given to debt reduction and tax 
reductions designed to stimulate investment and potential growth. In addition, 
a large part of the remaining fiscal dividend should be allocated towards 
reducing the relatively large personal income tax burden faced by many 
Canadian families and individuals. Finally, new spending initiatives should 
focus on measures to facilitate long-term growth. 
While planned debt reduction is an important component of a growth-
oriented fiscal policy, in the short run the size of the surplus should vary with 
the level of economic activity. From a stabilization standpoint, it is important 
that the automatic stabilizers be allowed to work, so larger than normal 
surpluses will be realized under strong growth conditions, and smaller 
surpluses (and even deficits!) when economic growth is below potential (or 




An Urgent Problem: Economic Growth 
 
 
Economic growth is the critical issue facing Canada today. Canada’s real 
disposable income per capita has grown little over the past ten years. 
Moreover, Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP) per worker has grown far 
less quickly than in most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries (see Fortin, 1999). The gap in after-tax per 
capita income between the United States and Canada has increased by over 
$4,500 (1998 purchasing power parity) in the past 17 years. Canada’s ratio of 
taxes to GDP (a simple measure of the tax burden) has increased to 37 per 
cent from 30 per cent in the early 1980s. The tax-GDP ratio in the United 
States is about 30 per cent, well below that of Canada’s.  
A critical factor that influences economic growth is productivity growth. 
Productivity growth implies that Canadians can use fewer resources and work 
less to produce the same output. It implies, therefore, for the same amount of 
time worked, Canadians can enjoy higher incomes.  
Productivity can be improved in several ways. Canadians can adopt new 
technologies through innovation that will result in greater amounts of goods 
and services to be produced from the same resources. Alternatively,  
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Canadians can improve their education so that they have the skills to produce 
goods and services with greater value-added. Governments can invest in 
infrastructure such as transportation and communication networks to im-
prove productivity of the overall economy. While each of these strategies can 
improve productivity, it is also important to make sure that the tax system is 
not a barrier to economic growth and job creation as well. 
Taxes can impair productivity in several ways: 
 
·   Taxes may distort economic decisions resulting in businesses and house-
holds taking decisions that fail to make the best use of resources in the 
economy. As prices are signals used by households and businesses to 
determine how best to allocate their funds amongst competing uses, taxes 
that distort prices faced by consumers and businesses result in a less 
efficient use of resources, and therefore inhibit our productivity.  
 
·   Taxes can discourage individuals from acquiring the skills needed in 
today’s workforce and therefore reduce the overall productivity of the 
economy as a result. They can also discourage individuals from partici-
pating in the workforce and reduce work effort. 
 
·   Taxes may impair innovation in the economy by discouraging indi-viduals 
and businesses to create, develop and market ideas or adopt new 
technologies used by others that would result in greater incomes for 
workers and supplier of inputs to business. 
 
·   In today’s global economy, with highly mobile business inputs, taxes that 
are out of line with other countries that provide similar public infra-
structure and training, will discourage business investments. The shift of 
resources to countries with lower taxes and comparable public services 
would reduce the productivity of the country with high taxes. 
 
We believe that the fiscal planning issues now facing Canada are of 
critical importance. With new technologies and forms of business activity that 
are resulting in increased international integration, capital, businesses and 
skilled individuals are becoming increasingly mobile. Government tax, 
regulatory and expenditure policies help to determine how much economic 
growth and productivity gains can be achieved in the increasingly competitive 
international arena. Today Canada has an unusual, if not unique, opportunity 
to put in place reforms, both to the tax system and to expendi-ture programs, 
in order to stimulate economic growth and productivity over the medium 
term. We should plan to use the anticipated fiscal dividend wisely, and avoid  
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squandering this opportunity through piecemeal spending increases and tax 
cuts. 
In this paper, we evaluate how changes in tax policy can improve the 
productivity of the Canadian economy. In our view, the recent approach of 
cutting taxes selectively — paying attention primarily to personal taxes — is 
inadequate. There are a range of urgent and pressing issues that require a 
comprehensive approach to tax cuts — namely, tax reform. Tax reform re-
quires substantial change to not only personal taxes, but also business taxes. 
An overall approach is required if Canada is to improve its productivity and 




Tax Reform and Static Efficiency Gains 
 
 
Business Tax Reforms  
 
Although the focus of the current public debate is on the desirability of 
personal income tax cuts, improvements in efficiency are more likely to be 
generated by reform of business taxation. Most economic studies have 
suggested that the most distortionary revenue sources are related to business 
taxes, particularly the corporate income tax. Effective tax rates on capital vary 
by industry, type of asset, size of firm and business organization. The 
business tax system is not only distortionary but also quite complicated. Some 
studies have suggested that each additional dollar of corporate income tax 
levied, causes the Canadian economy to lose nearly $1 in economic output 
(see Whalley, 1997). Therefore the total cost of raising one dollar of 
corporate income tax revenue can be about two dollars, once these distor-
tionary effects of the tax are taken into account. 
An ideal business tax system would be neutral with respect to different 
industries, asset types, and degrees of risk. Any non-neutralities in the system 
should be related to mitigation of the effects of market imperfections. 
Examples of corrective non-neutralities in the tax system include favourable 
treatment of small business (to offset capital market rationing) and incentives 
for research and development (in recognition of the positive spillovers 
generated by an increase in knowledge or know-how). 
In today’s world, not only should business taxes be neutral but they 
should also be levied at rates that are competitive internationally. This is 
especially important for the corporate income tax. Given the relative ease with  
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which corporations can shift income from high to low-taxed countries 
(without changing real economic activity), a country with a high corporate 
income tax rate could find its tax base eroded significantly. Recent studies 
have shown that as corporate income tax rates are increased, the gain in 
revenues is anywhere from 8 to 20 per cent less than what would be expected 
if the tax base did not change (see Dungan, Murphy and Wilson, 1997; and 
Jog and Tang, 1997). 
Four years ago, the Technical Committee on Business Taxation sub-
mitted its Report to the Minister of Finance. This report recommended a 
more neutral business tax system with lower and more competitive tax rates. 
High effective marginal corporate rates deter investment, and inter-industry 
and inter-asset variations in these effective rates distort the allocation of 
capital. Consequently, a reduction in the level of marginal effective tax rates 
and a reduction in their variance are high priorities from the standpoints of 
growth and efficiency. The Technical Committee recommended that the 
general federal corporate tax rate for large corporations be reduced by 9.1 
percentage points to 20 per cent and average provincial rates by one 
percentage point from 14 per cent to 13 per cent. For manufacturing income, 
the reduction would be only 2.1 percentage points, since the committee also 
recommended that the manufacturing and processing deduction be eliminated. 
This measure above would reduce corporate tax revenues by $2.2 billion 
in 1997. However, the committee also recommended a reduction in the aver-
age corporate tax rate for small business, and a variety of base-broadening 
measures such that their full set of measures would be approximately revenue 
neutral. 
As the base broadening measures would tend to reduce the inter-market 
and inter-asset variance of effective marginal rates, the combined package 
recommended by the committee would improve efficiency. 
Since the committee’s report was released, developments abroad have 
made the case for a further lowering of effective corporate tax rates in 
Canada more important. Within the G7, Japan, Germany and Italy have all 
reduced effective marginal rates substantially. The United Kingdom, which 
previously had the lowest effective marginal rate, also reduced its rate by two 
percentage points. As a result, Canada has become an outlier, with the highest 
effective marginal rates of any of the G7 countries (except Japan). 
Recent reforms in Scandinavia have resulted in companies being taxed at 
corporate income tax rates below 30 per cent in Finland, Sweden and 
Norway, and 32 per cent in Denmark. However, the aggressive business tax 
policies of Ireland are the most important case in point, since Ireland is the 
fastest growing OECD country of the past decade, virtually doubling its per 
capita GDP in ten years. While Ireland has reduced tax rates on manu- 
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facturing and financial service income to 10 per cent,
2 it also eliminated a 
number of special ineffective preferences for investments. After pressure 
from the European Union, Ireland is implementing a corporate income tax 
rate of 12.5 per cent by the year 2004 that will apply to all businesses. As 
shown later, Ireland and Sweden have a far more favourable tax treatment of 
investments compared to Canada. 
The Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act passed by the new 
Bush administration in the United States did not contain major changes in 
business taxation. But if additional changes are introduced in the future, there 
will be increased pressure on Canada to respond as well. 
 
Recent Federal Budget Changes.  The 1999 federal budget addressed only a 
few of the issues raised in the Report — the personal tax treatment of 
offshore investment trusts, a civil penalty on tax advisors who promote fraud 
and most importantly, a reduction in the corporate tax rate for one highly 
taxed sector — electric utilities. The changes were fairly minor and were not 
significant in terms of making Canada’s business t ax structure more 
competitive.  
  The February 2000 federal budget  and the October 2000 Economic 
Statement and budget update, however, did go much further. The 
government committed itself to a one percentage point reduction in corporate 
income tax rates for the broad service sector
3 in 2001, followed by four two-
percentage point cuts. It indicated that it would reduce the corporate income 
tax rate from 28 points to 21 points by the year 2004–05 for active business 
income in non-resource, non-manufacturing sectors. It also increased capital 
cost write-offs for railway assets, utility equipment and manufacturing 
equipment subject to obsolescence. The government also introduced a few 
tightening provisions  — tighter t hin-capitalization rules for debt owed to 
related non-residents, the abolition of non-resident-owned companies and 
adjustments for research and development expense deductions for provincial 
deductions in lieu of investment tax credit programs.  
The February 2000 budget business tax changes took many observers by 
surprise. The cut in corporate income tax rates, although small in the first 
year, are significant when fully implemented. The rate cuts, moreover, are 
                                                             
2This rate is substantially below the 30 per cent rate for other industries, resulting in 
less-favourably-taxed industries growing less quickly. 
3The broad service sector includes all i ndustries except manufacturing and 
processing and the resource sectors.  
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focused on the broad service sector, thereby r educing inter-industry 
distortions. Tax rates on manufacturing and processing income as well as on 
resource profits would remain unchanged. 
The impact of the February 2000 budget changes can be seen in Table 1. 
The small changes introduced for the year 2001 have little impact on effective 
tax rates on capital. Significant variation in effective tax rates remain across all 
sectors. But when the proposed corporate rate reductions are fully in effect in 
fiscal 2004–05, they have a much more dramatic impact. Most industries, 
except for mining, oil and gas, and manufacturing, would experience a sharp 
decline in the effective tax rate by over four percentage points. Although this 
tax reform is in the right direction, it still leaves considerable variation in 
effective tax rates on capital across industries and, in some cases, rates 
remain far too high thereby discouraging investment. 
Moreover, these changes will take five years to complete. This is rather 
disappointing progress given the substantial reforms taking place around the 
world, as mentioned above. In the near term the Canadian tax system will 
remain non-competitive as seen in Table 2 and, as discussed below. 
In 1996, Canada’s effective tax rate on capital invested in manufacturing 
was comparable to that of the United States and  lower  than  that  found  in  
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Table 1:  Marginal Effective Tax Rates in Canada: Large-sized 
          Tax-paying Firms (per cent) 






































































































a Our simulation shows that, by replacing the federal resource allowance with the 
deductibility for provincial mining tax and granting the manu-facturing corporate 
income tax credit (CIT), the effective tax rate (ETR) for mining sector would be 
about 18 per cent. 
b Our simulation shows that, by replacing the federal resource allowance with the 
deductibility for provincial royalty and granting the manufactur-ing CIT credit, the 
ETR for oil and gas sector would be about 25 per cent. 
c Estimate for the transportation sector reflects the higher CCA rate for railway 
equipment (i.e., 15 per cent instead of 10 per cent). 
d The estimate is made by assuming that 50 per cent of the public utility sector are 
in the power generating business, which started phasing in the M&P tax credit from 
year 2000 and may benefit from the higher tax allowance for CCA class 1 (i.e., 8 
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Germany, France, Italy and Japan and higher than rates in the United  
Kingdom, Sweden and Ireland.  The broad service  sector  was  more  highly 
 taxed  in Canada compared especially to the United States and to most 
countries, except Germany, Italy and Japan. 
In the current year and in 2001, Canada’s competitive position will erode 
as a result of reforms in many countries. In 2000, Canada’s effective tax rate 
in manufacturing, while still comparable to that in the United States, is below 
only Germany’s. However, in 2001, Germany’s substantial reform of its 
system will put its effective tax rate well below Canada’s. For services, in the 
year 2001 Canada’s effective tax rate is well above most countries. 
With prospective reductions in federal and provincial statutory corporate 
tax rates, by 2006, Canada’s effective tax rate on capital will be competitive 
with the United States but still above those of the United Kingdom, Sweden 
and Ireland. However, it is likely that many of these countries will undertake 
further changes to their corporate income tax systems. It can be expected that 
in five years further reductions in corporate income tax rates will take place in 
many countries combined with initiatives to broaden their tax bases.  
 
The Need for Further Reforms.  As the full implementation of the Technical 
Committee’s recommended rate reductions would bring Canadian statutory 
rates well below U.S. rates, it would result in a significant improvement of the 
competitiveness of Canadians businesses relative to the United States and 
help combat base erosion. However, even at a combined federal/provincial 
rate of 33 per cent, the committee’s recommendations would place Canada’s 
corporate income tax rate only at the average of the OECD countries.  
If all of the Technical Committee’s recommendations were implemented, 
the dispersion of marginal effective rates of tax on capital across industries 
and assets would be reduced. This should entail some efficiency gains by 
improving the allocation of capital. 
As discussed, these  recommendations entail virtually  no change in 
average effective marginal tax rates. This is not surprising, given the revenue 
neutral constraint faced by the committee. On the other hand, the February 
2000 federal budget cut effective tax rates but failed to move aggressively in 
reducing non-neutralities and rates. Once the requirement of revenue 
neutrality is relaxed, it is feasible to design tax reductions to stimulate invest-
ment and make the tax system more efficient. We accept the committee’s 
view that R&D already receives extraordinarily favourable tax treatment in 
Canada. Therefore, our focus should be on stimulating capital investment. 
The Technical Committee report was partly criticized for eliminating a 
number of important special preferences for certain business activities in 
order to help cover the revenue loss arising from corporate income tax rate  
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reductions. While general reductions in corporate statutory rates are of benefit 
to all forms of capital investment, they may result in greater losses in revenue 
compared to investment  tax credits. Some investment tax credits are 
appropriate since they can encourage investments in specific activities with-
out distorting the tax base used by federal and provincial governments for 
allocating corporate income to the provinces. In our view,  it may be 
appropriate to consider investment tax credits for certain activities that are 
insufficient due to market imperfections (undiversifiable risky investments or 
technology-related investments) and to smooth over transitional impacts of 
tax reform that eliminates special preferences for specific industrial activities 
(e.g., new mine assets). 
Using the tax evaluation model maintained at the Institute for 
International Business at the University of Toronto, we have evaluated the 
impact of reduced statutory rates and investment tax credits on marginal 
effective rates on investments in new capital. 
Table 3 presents effective marginal rates for 2000 (the “base case”) and 
what effective marginal rates would be under four alternatives. The first two 
incorporate reductions of statutory rates of one and three percentage points. 
The third incorporates a 1 per cent investment credit for machinery and 
equipment, and the fourth incorporates a 1 per cent investment credit for all 
plant and equipment. 
The results indicate that a three percentage point reduction in the 
statutory rate would reduce effective marginal rates in the broadly defined 
service sector by about two percentage points. Effective rates in manufactur-
ing would drop by 1.7 percentage points. Effective rates in the resource 
sector would actually increase, because of the interaction of statutory rates 
with various credits and allowances. 
Investment tax credits (ITCs) would reduce the marginal effective tax 
rate for all industries. A general ITC of 1 per cent has a stronger effect than a 
3 per cent rate cut for oil and gas, mining, and transportation and 
communications; has about the same effect for manufacturing and forestry; 
and has a weaker effect in the other service sectors and construction. Looking 
at the inter-industry variability of marginal effective tax rates (METRs), it 
would appear that a 3 per cent statutory rate cut would reduce these 
distortions, whereas an ITC would increase them somewhat. 
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Table 3: Impact of Corporate Tax Changes on Marginal Effective 
  Tax Rates: Large-sized Tax-paying Firms Only  




























































































































































































Notes:  Base case = The current tax system.       
Case 1 = Reduce the corporate income tax rate by one percentage point. 
Case 2 = Reduce the corporate income tax rate by three percentage points. 
Case 3 = One percentage point investment tax credit for machinery and equipment. 
Case 4 = One percentage point investment tax credit for both buildings and 
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International Comparisons and International Competitiveness  
 
In an open economy, the business tax structure must be designed with an eye 
to the likely response of multinational corporations (MNCs) as well as to its 
longer term effects on international competitiveness. Attention should be paid 
to both statutory and effective marginal rates. Statutory rate differentials may 
provide incentives for MNCs to shift expenses to and income away from high 
tax reductions, through transfer pricing and debt management practices. 
Statutory rate differences may also influence location decisions. 
Current and projected corporate statutory rates for OECD countries are 
presented in Table 4. The corporate statutory rate for large manufacturers in 
Canada lies in the middle of this group of countries, but the statutory rate for 
large non-manufacturing firms is currently above all the other countries 
(except for Germany and Japan). Projected rates for 2006 indicate that the 
Canadian corporate tax rate will be below the level of the United States, 
Japan, Germany and France, but remain higher than many other countries. 
Differences in effective marginal tax rates also provide incentives for 
MNCs to adjust their real capital stocks, increasing investment in countries 
with relatively low effective marginal rates in relation to other countries. 
In order to prevent substantial revenue erosion, statutory rates should not 
be higher than rates typically found in other industrialized countries where 
MNC investments take place. In order to stimulate investment and provide 
economic growth, effective tax rates on capital should be lower than in other 
competing jurisdictions. 
The implementation of the Technical Committee’s recommendations 
regarding statutory rates would establish Canada’s rates at the OECD average 
and well below U.S. statutory rates, thereby eliminating the principal sources 
of revenue erosion via debt shifting and transfer pricing. However, as noted 
above, the February 2000 budget will reduce effective marginal rates of tax 
on investment by four percentage points for service sectors but have little 
impact on manufacturing and resource sectors.  
A reduction in the combined general corporate income tax rate to 30 per 
cent instead of 32 per cent accompanied by base-broadening would reduce 
typical marginal effective tax rates for non-resource firms by about 1 to 1.5 
percentage points. The lower statutory rate would also make Canada more 
attractive relative to other countries, providing added deterrence to debt 
shifting and transfer pricing by MNCs. 
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Table 4: Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rates in Selected 
   OECD Countries
a 
 
  July 31, 1996  January 1, 
1999 
Change  Intentions (year) 
Australia  36  36.0  -  30.0 (2000) 
Canada
b  34.9/43.2  35.0/43.3  -  32.0 (2006)
c 
Denmark  34  32.0  ¯   
France  41.7  36.7/40.0
d  ¯  37.8 (2000) 
Germany  56.1  51.9
e  ¯   35.0 - 38.0 (2001)
f 
Ireland  10.0/38.0  10.0/28.0  ¯  12.5 (2003) 
Italy  53.2  31.3 - 41.3
g  ¯   
Japan  52.2  48.0  ¯  41.0 (2000) 
Netherlands  37.0/35.0  35.0  ¯   
Norway  28.0  28.0  -   
Poland  40.0  34.0  ¯  22 (2004) 
Sweden  28.0  28.0  -   
Switzerland  35.5  25.1  ¯   
Turkey  44.0  33.0  ¯   
United Kingdom  33.0  30.0
h  ¯   
United States
i  39.2  39.2  -   
Notes:  
a The 1996 rates are based on the former Coopers & Lybrand, 1997 International Tax 
Summaries and the 1999 rates are adopted from the KPMG, Corporate Tax Rates Survey, 
January 1999, unless otherwise specified.  
b The rate is a combination of the federal CIT rate (22.1 per cent and 29.1 per cent respectively 
for manufacturing and others) and the average of provincial CIT rates  weighted  by the 
provincial GDP by industry. The minor difference between the two years reflects some 
changes in provincial CIT rates. 
c This is a weighted average of all industries. Note that the current general CIT rate of 43 per 
cent will still be applicable to the resources sector, which also enjoys various preferential tax 
treatments unavailable to any non-resource sectors. 
d The rate is a combination of the corporate income tax rate of 33.33 per cent and the surtax of 
10 per cent and 20 per cent respectively. The lower surtax is applied to smaller-scaled firms 
which are mainly owned by individuals. For the year 2000 and future years, the lower rate will 
apply to all firms. (See Ernst & Young, 1999 Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, for details.) 
e Our estimate is based on Ernst & Young, 2000 Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide. It 
includes a corporate income tax rate of 40 per cent, an average trade tax of 16.75 per cent 
(ranged from 13 per cent to 20.5 per cent) which is deductible for the CIT purpose, and a 
surcharge of 5.5 per cent on CIT payable.  
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f Refer to Tax Notes International, Vol. 20, No. 4, 24 January 2000.  
g The higher rate (41.3 per cent) includes a general corporate income tax rate of 37 per cent 
and a regional tax of 4.25 per cent. The latter is levied on the Italian-source income from 
productive activities, which includes interest payments and labour cost. The general CIT rate 
may be reduced to 19 per cent for qualifying taxable income corresponding to the ordinary 
remuneration (currently 7 per cent) of the net equity increase. However, the average corporate 
income tax rate for a company may not fall below 27 per cent, which, combined with the 
regional tax rate of 4.25 per cent, resulted in the lower aggregated income tax rate of 31.3 per 
cent.  
h Effective as of April 1, 1999. 
i Our estimate based on an average state corporate income tax rate of 6.5 per cent (ranged 




Because a reduction in corporate statutory rates would stimulate an 
increase in the tax base, the revenue costs would be somewhat attenuated. 
The Technical Committee estimates that the elasticity of the corporate tax 
base with respect to a reduction in tax rates is about 0.15. Based on this 
elasticity in 1998, for example, a two percentage point reduction in all 
corporate tax rates would involve a revenue loss of about $1.3 billion of 
federal corporate tax revenue (representing about 7 per cent of federal 
corporate tax revenues).
4 In future years, however, this relative revenue loss 
would be further attenuated, as the lower corporate tax rates lead to higher 
investment, a higher capital stock, and hence increased labour productivity 
and real output. 
 
 
Impact of Corporate Taxes on the User Cost of  
Capital and Investment 
 
The corporate tax structure is a major determinant of the “user cost” of 
capital.
5 Reductions in statutory corporate rates, increases in CCAs, or 
increases in investment tax credits will each lower the user cost of capital. 
Except for the special case where capital is not substitutable for other inputs, 
a reduction in the user cost will stimulate real investment. 
                                                             
4This revenue loss is less than the fiscal cost estimate derived from Department of 
Finance Canada (1999, p. 113). 
5Other factors include the real rate of interest and the relative prices of capital 
goods.  
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In the FOCUS macro-econometric model, maintained by the Institute for 
Policy Analysis of the University of Toronto, variations in these key tax 
parameters affect investment in machinery and equipment and non-residential 
structures. Since we recommend reductions in statutory rates, we implement 
these measures in the FOCUS model to incorporate their net impacts on each 
category of investment and on the corresponding capital stocks. 
As noted earlier, higher rates of investment will gradually increase the 
capital stock, thereby raising potential growth and labour productivity. Higher 
future levels of output will affect most major revenue sources. These longer 
term “tax recaptures” will reduce the future revenue losses from the tax 
reduction measures. The results of this analysis are reported in the section 




Summary of Recommendations for Corporate Taxes 
 
 
We support the implementation of the seven percentage point reduction in the 
general corporate rate in the February 2000 federal budget, as laid out in the 
October 2000 Statement. The first one percentage point rate reduction 
already took place on January 1, 2001 and the minister of finance confirmed 
in his May 2001 Economic Update that further cuts of two percentage points 
in each of the following three years will proceed as planned. These reductions 
are a start in reforming the corporate tax, but further changes are still 
required. Specifically, we recommend that the minister: 
 
·   Implement the base-broadening and other recommendations of the 
Report of the Technical Committee (including the elimination of the 4 per 
cent corporate surtax). This will permit additional reductions of federal 
and provincial statutory rates, bringing the combined rate close to 30 per 
cent. 
 
·   Provide selective investment credits that provide transitional relief for 
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Reducing Effective Marginal Personal  
Income Tax Rates 
 
Personal taxes affect productivity in several ways. Personal taxes assessed at 
high marginal tax rates — the percentages of additional income that is taxed 
through income, sales, payroll and other taxes that affect the individual — can 
discourage work effort, savings, risk taking and entrepreneurship. High taxes, 
relative to the public services that such taxes fund, can dis-courage individuals 
from moving to Canada or encourage Canadians to move to other countries. 
In international comparisons within the OECD or G7, Canada stands out 
as: having a relatively high rate of personal income taxes as a percentage of 
GDP; and having increased the personal income tax burden the most over the 
past decade. 
These comparisons refer, of course to average burdens, and are related 
to average rates of tax. When one examines individuals and families in 
different circumstances, and when effective marginal rates are brought into 
the picture, the case for personal tax reform and personal tax reduction is 
even stronger. 
Canada is unique among leading industrialized countries, in that children 
are not recognized as affecting the ability to pay income taxes. Rather, 
Canada relies solely on the so-called “Child Tax Benefit”, a transfer payment 
system with clawbacks that reduce and eventually eliminate the benefit once 
certain threshold levels of income are reached. Unlike most other OECD 
countries, Canada’s personal income tax (PIT) is basically on an individual 
basis. This has the consequence that a family’s tax burden does not just 
depend on the family’s level of net income, but varies with the distribution 
of income within the family. A family with a single earner therefore faces a 
considerably higher burden than a family with the same income earned by 
two or more family members. 
The clawbacks of the Child Tax Benefit and other transfers and credits as 
well as payroll taxes raise effective marginal rates for low and moderate 
income families. These and other anomalies in the existing tax-transfer system 
have been examined in recent papers by Mintz and Poschmann (1999) and 
by Wilson (1998). Figure 1, reproduced from Mintz and Poschmann, shows 
the current effective marginal rates for a single earner family in Ontario. As 
illustrated, the highest effective marginal rate — about 60 per cent, is faced 
by a family earning about $25,000! This is the direct result of the interaction 
of clawbacks of transfers with the PIT.  
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Wilson examined the interaction of clawbacks of pensions for seniors 
with the PIT. As illustrated in Figure 2, even more anomalous rates are faced 
by seniors with low incomes. The interaction of the clawback of the GIS with 
the first bracket of the PIT produces effective marginal rates as high as 75 
per cent! At higher income levels, seniors face effective marginal rates seven 
to eight percentage points higher than top marginal rates for other taxpayers, 
as a result of the 15 per cent clawback of Old Age Security (OAS). 
In 1987 Canada implemented a major reform of the income tax system, 
which had as a major objective reductions in marginal rates and a simplified 
system of three rate brackets. Over time, the system has become more 
complex, with federal and provincial surtaxes and clawbacks creating many 
additional effective rate brackets (Macnaughton, Matthews and Pittman, 
1998). 
   Federal surtaxes, higher provincial tax rates, and provincial surtaxes 
increased the top marginal rates well above the 43.5 per cent level envisaged 
in the 1987 reform. As important, the effect of the partial de-indexation of the 
PIT — implemented in 1985 — has gradually eroded the real value of 
personal credits and deductions, and the real size of the income tax rate 
bracket thresholds. 
In recent years, Ontario has implemented a major reduction in provincial 
PIT rates, while other provinces have put in place more modest reductions, 
and the general federal surtax has been eliminated. Alberta has implemented a 
flat tax of 11 per cent, which results in a top marginal rate of 41 per cent in 
2001. While these measures represent steps in the right direction, the PIT in 
Canada nevertheless remains steeply progressive, with individuals earning the 
average industrial wage facing combined marginal income tax rates of 35–40 
per cent,
6 and the top marginal rate (including federal and Ontario surtaxes) 
kicking in at an income level just above $63,000.
7 
The February 2000 federal budget and the October 2000 Statement have 
begun the process of reducing marginal rates, through the elimination of the 
“high income” surtax and reducing middle bracket rates. Furthermore, the 
restoration of full indexation will halt the “bracket creep” that was a major 
factor in the past increase in personal tax burdens. The measures 
                                                             
6As noted above, when clawbacks and payroll taxes are taken into account, 
effective marginal rates are higher. 
7For individuals with employment income, the top marginal rate takes effect at an 
income level of $63,671 in 1999 in most provinces. British Columbia, New Brunswick and 
Nova Scotia have surtaxes that kick in at higher income levels (see KPMG, 2000, p. 13).  
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implemented in the budget plan (including the measures in the five-year plan) 
would reduce personal taxes as a per cent of GDP by about one percentage 
point (of which indexation accounts for roughly one-half). The February 2000 
budget and the October 2000 Statement therefore represent an important 
start. However, further measures will be needed to bring Canada’s relative 
PIT burden closer to those of our international trading partners. 
 
 
Income Taxes, Consumption Taxes and Savings 
 
The personal income tax in Canada has long been a “hybrid” tax which has 
elements of a consumption base as well as an income base. The exclusion of 
imputed rent on housing and other consumer durables places the taxation of 
these consumer assets essentially on a consumption base. The deductions for 
Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP), Deferred Profit Sharing Plan 
(DPSP) and Registered Pension Plan (RPP) contributions eliminate the 
double taxation of savings invested in these registered plans. However, as the 
yield on other assets held outside these plans is subject to income tax, 
considerable double taxation of savings remains under Canada’s PIT. 
The pension reform of 1990 promised to level the playing field for 
contributors to RRSPs and members of RRPs. Contribution levels were to be 
equalized and indexed. However, indexing has been repeatedly postponed, 
and the current RRSP limit is below the threshold for deemed equivalence to 
defined benefit pension plans. A key savings incentive in the PIT has 
gradually been eroded as a result. 
Indexing of RRSP/RPP contribution limits has been repeatedly postponed 
in various federal budgets. Currently, indexing is scheduled to begin in 2004. 
Furthermore, the contribution limits were rolled back below the $15,500 level 
originally proposed to $13,500 currently. 
The steady erosion of the contribution limits in the absence of indexation 
has shifted the PIT more towards an income base and away from a con-
sumption base. This erosion may have contributed to the recent declines in 
personal savings rates.
8 In addition, the growth of PIT revenues relative to 
revenues from indirect taxes on consumption (the GST and federal excise 
taxes) has shifted the relative weight of total federal taxes from consumption 
to savings. 
                                                             
8However, other factors, in particular the increased importance of capital gains 
relative to other income, have probably been more important.  
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It is important to halt, at least, this shift of taxation from consumption to 
savings. This can be accomplished by concentrating further tax reductions on 
the PIT, and increasing savings incentives within the PIT. As noted above, 
the February 2000 federal budget has implemented PIT reductions and has 
restored full indexation for credits and rate brackets. However, the budget did 




Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Risk-taking 
 
                                                             
9The budget did raise the foreign content limit for RRSPs and RPPs from 20 per 
cent to 30 per cent over two years. This measure should improve risk-adjusted rates of 
return within registered plans. 
A significant factor underlying productivity is the willingness of entre-preneurs 
to innovate and take risks. Innovation is the process whereby individuals (and 
businesses for that matter), are able to make better use of resources so that 
more output can be produced from the same amount of labour and capital 
used in the production process. Part of the innovation process is related to 
research and development that result in cost-saving technologies or new 
products. However, innovation depends on more than just research and 
development. It also depends on individuals acquiring knowledge and skills to 
develop and use new technologies. Innovation is also related to the ability of 
individuals to develop new forms of organization and business management, 
which help improve the capacity of businesses to compete in today’s global 
economy. 
It has been shown that Canada, despite having one of the richest R&D 
incentive systems in the world, has a mediocre rate of research and 
development. It has also been shown that Canada has been fairly successful 
at cost-savings innovations but not product development (Trefler, 1999). Is 
this a result of inadequate incentives for research and development (note that 
Canada’s generous tax incentives apply equally to both forms of research and 
development)? Or do the lack of product development innovations reflect a 
wider problem in the tax system? As the Technical Committee notes in its 
report, innovation depends not only on the incentive for entrepreneurs and 
businesses to develop new products and cost-savings processes but also on 
the demand by business to adopt such innovations. 
We believe that the business tax measures, recommended in the first part 
of the report, would encourage both innovation and risk-taking by reducing 
the overall level of taxes, especially on the knowledge-based part of the 
economy, while leaving Canada with one of the most generous incentives for 
research and development in the world through the tax credit mechanism.  
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However, additional incentives are needed in the PIT to encourage entre-
preneurs to undertake innovative activity and risk-taking. There are two key 
elements. The first would be a reduction in the overall personal tax rates that, 
as a result of high marginal tax rates, discourages investment, risk-taking and 
work effort. The second would be new capital gains tax incentives that do not 
inhibit the ability of firms to grow as well as encourage risk-taking.  
There are three particular issues related to the taxation of capital gains: 
 
·   First, capital gains taxes are applied to realizations, with the con-sequence 
of encouraging investors to “lock-in” holdings rather than sell them to 
buy more productive assets. Although the investor is able to defer tax on 
capital gains by holding assets rather than selling them, the “lock-in” 
effect can impede dynamic efficiency by discouraging the rebalancing of 
portfolios from poor to better quality assets. (There are restrictive 
circumstances in which investors can sell assets and defer capital gains 




·   Second, capital losses generally can only be used to reduce capital gains 
for tax purposes. There are many circumstances in which capital losses 
cannot be used at all. Even if the capital losses can be used, they are 
carried forward at no interest, so that the time value of the losses are 
reduced the longer it takes to use up the losses. The lack of full refund-
ability of losses reduces the incentive to invest in risky ventures since 
governments also share the gains but not the losses.
11 Although one could 
allow capital losses to be used to reduce other income, there are potential 
significant tax revenue losses if investors time the sale of their assets to 
shelter non-capital income from tax. 
 
·   Third, capital gains are taxed without accounting for the effects of 
inflation on the value of the original cost of the investment. Without 
indexation of capital gains for inflation, the effective tax rate on capital 
gains is increased. This is partly, wholly or more than wholly offset by 
the deferral of taxes on capital gains, since the capital gains taxes are only 
                                                             
10Note that if the capital gains tax applied to accrued, rather than realized gains, 
there would be no “lock-in” effect since taxes could not be postponed. 
11See Mintz and Wilson (2000a). We show that the incidence of capital losses 
relative to gains has been relatively high for investors with less that $100,000 in income.  
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paid when assets are disposed of rather than on the accrued gain as the 
value of the assets increase year by year. The impact of inflation on the 
cost of holding assets subject to capital gains taxation is also offset by the 
degree to which individuals borrow money to purchase the asset, since 
the interest expense is deductible without adjustment for inflation. The 
degree to which the deferral of taxes on gains and the lack of adjustment 
for inflation affects the overall tax rate, depends on the length of time that 
assets are held and the rate of inflation. 
 
  Generally, the above first two issues and possibly the third suggest that 
capital gains should be effectively taxed at a lower rate than ordinary income. 
However, there is another constraint facing the government in that it is 
relatively easy to convert higher taxed forms of income, particularly 
dividends, into capital gains. Governments have tried to reduce complexity in 
the tax system by ensuring that dividends and capital gains are taxed at similar 
rates  — otherwise, complex anti-avoidance rules are required to prevent 
dividends from being converted into capital gains. However, until the recent 
changes in capital gains taxation in Canada, dividends were taxed more lightly 
than other forms of income, since individuals received a dividend tax credit to 
reduce personal taxes owing on dividends. The purpose of the dividend tax 
credit is to integrate personal and corporate income taxes on distributed 
income.
12 Thus, the role of the partial exclusion of capital gains from income 
is also to integrate corporate and personal taxes on profits reinvested in the 
corporation that result in an increase in the value of the corporate equities. 
In the year 2000 in Ontario, the combined federal/provincial top personal 
income tax rate was 48 per cent. Dividends, net of the credit, were subject to 
a tax rate of 32 per cent while the capital gains tax rate was 36 per cent, after 
applying the one-quarter exclusion rate of capital gains. Thus, to equalize 
taxes on capital gains and dividends, it was appropriate to increase the 
exclusion rate from one-quarter to one-third, assuming no other changes in 
the tax system. This reform was included in the February 2000 federal 
budget. However, if there are further reforms to lower personal tax rates or 
changes to the corporate income tax rate for small business income, then 
further adjustments in the dividend credit rate and the capital gains exclusion 
rate would be appropriate. As we have noted elsewhere (Mintz and Wilson, 
2000a, p. 25), with general reductions in corporate and personal rates, the 
                                                             
12The dividend tax credit is set to integrate corporate and personal taxes at the 
small business level, which is subject to tax at a federal and provincial average rate of about 
20 per cent.  
Taxes, Efficiency and Economic Growth                  117 
capital gains inclusion rate could be reduced to one-half. The October 2000 
Statement reduced the capital gains inclusion rate to one-half, but did not 
adjust the dividend tax credit. As a result, effective tax rates on capital gains 
are now below effective tax rates on dividends, reversing the situation in 
effect before the February 2000 budget. 
Canada also provides an incentive for individuals to hold farm property 
and shares in qualifying Canadian-controlled private corporations through the 
$500,000 lifetime capital gains exemption. Prior to 1994, a general $100,000 
lifetime capital gains exemption was also available for the holding of all assets 
but was found to be ineffective in encouraging investment and risk-taking 
(Mintz and Richardson, 1994, p. 15). The current exemption is provided with 
the aim of giving farmers and small business owners an opportunity to save 
income for retirement since it is not possible for these individuals to use the 
current RRSP system for tax-assisted retirement savings since they would 
need to have earned income to access the system. 
The existing $500,000 lifetime capital gains exemption, however, is 
inefficient and unfair. The exemption can be used by owners to restructure 
large businesses so long as the shares qualify for the exemption. The 
exemption also impedes the growth of companies since it is only available for 
shares of private, not public corporations. Further, the exemption provides 
those individuals who have adequate access to the existing RRSP/RPP 
system from other earned income a greater opportunity to save for retirement 
purposes by holding qualifying farm property and private corporate shares as 
well as their RRSP or pension assets. 
The Technical Committee on Business Taxation recommended the 
replacement of the lifetime capital gains exemption with an enhanced RRSP 
system that would give farmers and small business owners opportunities to 
save income for retirement by rolling over their gains into RRSPs, up to a 
limit that depends on the years in which the assets are held and the degree to 
which savings have not been invested in the RRSP system. We would 
endorse this proposal. 
The February 2000 federal budget has introduced a rollover provision for 
investments in qualifying small business shares. This measure should improve 
small business access to venture capital. However, other incentives might be 
considered to encourage the growth of smaller businesses. For example, one 
important incentive, used in the United States, is to provide favourable capital 
gains treatment for small businesses that issue shares to the public for the first 
time (Brown, Mintz and Wilson, 2000). One could also provide greater room 
for individuals to save for retirement purposes by expanding RRSP limits for 
the ownership of certain assets, such as venture capital. 
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Summary Recommendations for Personal Income 
Taxes 
 
A large part of the fiscal dividend should be allocated to personal income tax 
reforms that entail significant reductions in average tax burdens. A program 
for tax reform needs to be designed, and it should be gradually implemented 
as the potential fiscal dividend grows. 
Our priorities for this program are: 
 
·   The steeply progressive rates faced by low and middle income families 
need to be reduced by: 
®  modifying clawbacks (and/or lowering the first bracket rate) so that 
no one faces a marginal rate higher than the richest Canadian,  
®  reducing the middle bracket rate, 
®  widening the first and second brackets to gradually restore their real 
values towards 1985 levels,  
®  restoring full indexation of the basic amounts and rate brackets, and 
®  eliminating the 5 per cent high income surtax. 
 
·   Children need to be recognized as affecting ability to pay income taxes. 
An indexed “amount” subject to credit should be available for each child 
in a family. 
 
·   RRSP limits should be increased to $15,500 and fully indexed from now 
on. 
 
A start has been made in implementing many of the aspects of this 
program. The February 2000 federal budget reduced the middle bracket rate 
to 24 per cent, and an additional reduction to 23 per cent is part of the 
announced five-year reduction plan. The October 2000 Statement imple-
mented a further reduction in the middle bracket rate to 22 per cent, and 
created an additional upper middle bracket with a rate of 26 per cent. As of 
January 1, 2001, the top marginal rate of 29 per cent kicks in at an income of 
$100,000. The budget also restored full indexation of basic amounts and rate 
brackets, and the five-year plan promises a modest widening of the rate 
brackets. In addition, following the October 2000 Statement, the 5 per cent 
surtax, which was to be phased out in the five-year plan, was eliminated 
effective January 2, 2001. However, more still needs to be done. Neither the 
budget nor subsequent statement did anything about the clawbacks. And the  
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widening of the tax brackets and credits in the five-year plan is insufficient to 
restore them to their 1985 values in real terms.  
As discussed below, the remaining required changes cannot be imple-
mented all at once, but should be feasible within the context of a five-year 
fiscal plan. 
More fundamental reforms should also be considered. The tax treatment 
of the family needs to be reviewed, with an eye towards reducing, if not 
eliminating the effects of within family income distribution on net taxes paid. 
The integration of personal and corporate taxes and the tax treatment of 
capital gains should be modified to eliminate fully the double taxation of 
corporate source income, and to reduce the rate of tax on dividends 
accordingly. Further rate reductions should be considered, particularly for the 
lowest income bracket,





Payroll taxes in Canada are lower than in most other industrial countries. 
However, it should be noted that these taxes generally finance social 
insurance benefits — primarily public pensions, and unemployment benefits. 
While the linkages from taxes to benefits may be loose for some individuals,
14 
there are recognized benefits financed, in large part, by earmarked taxes. As a 
result, the much higher payroll taxes in Europe mainly reflect the higher social 
insurance benefits paid there. Similarly, higher federal payroll taxes in the 
United States reflect more generous U.S. social security pensions relative to 
Canada/Quebec Pension Plans (CPP/QPP) pensions. 
In 1997, the federal and provincial governments reached an agreement to 
ensure the long-run financial viability of the CPP. Although there were some 
modest reductions in benefits, most of the reduction in the unfunded liability 
of the CPP was to be effected by a 65 per cent increase in CPP payroll tax 
rates, to be phased in over the 1998 to 2003 period. While alternatives to this 
approach have been put forward (Dungan, 1998; Pesando, 1997), in this 
paper we accept the CPP payroll tax increases as a given. 
                                                             
13The October 2000 Statement reduced the first bracket rate by one percentage 
point, effective January 1, 2001. 
14In Canada, for example, unemployment benefit payments are partially clawed 
back for individuals with income above a threshold. 
Dungan’s (1998) examination of the economic effects of the scheduled 
CPP/QPP payroll tax increases indicates that, even when the payroll tax 
increase is fully shifted to workers in the long run, there are nevertheless  
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adverse transitional effects that reduce aggregate output and cause job losses. 
These effects would be mitigated or eliminated if other payroll taxes were 
reduced as the CPP rate increases take effect. The obvious candidate for this 
role is the EI contribution rate. At present the Employment Insurance (EI) 
“Fund” has a large accumulated surplus, and EI revenues exceed 
unemployment benefits and other outlays by $5–6 billion per year. As it is the 
employer portion of payroll taxes that generates the adverse transitional 
economic effects, and as employer EI payroll taxes are 1.4 times employee 
contributions, and apply to a higher income level than CPP contributions, a 
given CPP rate increase for employees can be offset by a smaller employee 
EI rate cut. 
One approach, which was recommended by the Technical Committee, is 
to implement a limited form of experience rating via selective reductions in 
the employers’ portion of the EI tax. We would strongly endorse this 
recommendation, which would improve labour-force adjustments and reduce 
the unemployment rate over the medium term. However, if limited experience 
rating is rejected, the overall EI rate should be reduced as a second-best 
alternative. For example, if the basic EI contribution rate for employees were 
reduced by 20¢ per year over the three-year period 2001–03, this would 
offset most of the adverse transitional effects of scheduled increases in 




The Room for Tax Reductions: An Illustrative Exercise 
 
 
In 1999 Finance Canada engaged four forecasting organizations to develop 
estimates of the potential surplus (or “fiscal dividend”) that would be 
generated over a five-fiscal-year period (2001–02 through 2004–05). These 
estimates were developed on the basis of a common set of economic 
projections — the so-called “consensus” or average of forecasts of private 
sector firms and organizations — and a common set of fiscal assumptions. 
They have served as the base for all subsequent discussions about the 
utilization of the fiscal dividend and are still a useful reference point today. 
Beyond the fiscal measures already put in place by past budgets, these fiscal 
projections entail no change in basic tax rates, and program spending (other 
than EI and OAS/GIS payments) held constant in real per capita terms. 
The average results of this exercise were published by the Department of 
Finance in the 1999 Economic and Fiscal Update (Canada, Department of 
Finance, 1999, p. 80). We reproduce the average projected potential  
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surpluses in the first line of Table 5. As is shown, the projected fiscal 
dividend steadily increases, reaching a level of $30 billion in 2004–05. 
PEAP was one of the four forecasting/modelling organizations involved. 
The projected potential surpluses, that PEAP developed for this exercise are 
presented in the second line of Table 5. While these near-term estimates are 
close to the average, in the later years, the PEAP model generates a larger 
fiscal dividend, reaching $33 billion in 2004–05. This result reflects more 
buoyant corporate tax revenues, somewhat higher EI revenues and lower EI 
payouts in PEAP’s analysis. 
These projections, although published in November 1999, were con-
structed using information available in September 1999. The economic 
outlook improved significantly in the intervening months as reflected in 
forecasts published by Consensus Economics, and in various statements 
published in the financial press. 
PEAP released a long-term economic forecast on November 10, 1999, 
which incorporated this additional information. We then reconstructed the 
fiscal dividend projection, using this long-term economic projection, but 
maintaining the same fiscal assumptions as in the September 1999 exercise. 
These results are shown in the third line of Table 5. The potential surplus 
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a The projections were updated on the basis of the fourth quarter National 
Accounts data. Fiscal projections were based on the growth rates of the previous 
projection.  
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But in the last two years (2003–04 and 2004–05) there is little difference 
between the November and original estimates. This shows that projections of 
the out-years in a medium-term forecast are not terribly sensitive to small 
differences in the starting point. 
With the release of the fourth quarter 2000 National Accounts data, and 
revisions for the previous three quarters, we updated these fiscal projections 
(maintaining the same fiscal assumptions). These results are shown in the 
fourth line of Table 5. As shown, the potential surplus is higher in every year 
of the analysis, but again not greatly so. 
The February 2000 budget introduced a number of tax reductions. It also 
included spending initiatives, many of which were pre-booked to fiscal 1999–
2000. There were also spending initiatives announced prior to the budget, but 
after the November statement, and an EI payroll tax cut on January 1, 2000. 
Two important measures in the budget offset the medium-term fiscal outlook: 
full indexation of the basic amounts, and rate brackets was restored,
15 and the 
five-year tax reduction plan was announced. 
We have implemented all of these measures in our analysis of the budget. 
As no time pattern for future tax reductions was announced in the February 
2000 budget, we assume that all future tax cuts are smoothly implemented 
over the five-year period. Consistent with the assumption in the budget (and 
with past behaviour) we assume that debt reduction is limited to $3 billion per 
year. When the budget measures are incorporated, the estimated fiscal 
dividend is reduced, but not eliminated, as shown in line 6 of Table 5. 
A key assumption in the construction of these potential surplus estimates 
was that debt reduction would be $3 billion per year. Debt reduction 
obviously affects the magnitude of potential surpluses in the later years by 
reducing future interest payments to service the debt. 
Table 6 presents an analysis that allows for larger debt paydowns, 
particularly in the early years. As a result, the potential surplus generated is 
somewhat larger in 2004–05 at $14.3 billion, about $0.5 billion higher than 
with the steady $3 billion per year debt paydown assumed in the projections 
of Table 5. 
We believe that a strong case can be made for larger planned debt 
paydowns in the early years.  As  shown  in  Table  6,  if  debt  reduction  is  
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Table 6: Derivation of Room for Additional Tax Reductions: 
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Note:   *This is the interest on the additional debt reduction above $3 billion per 




doubled in the first two years, and then gradually reduced to $3 billion by 
2004–05, the future potential surplus would be increased. 
We view debt reduction, particularly in the early years, as important for 
the following reasons. 
 
·   Larger debt reduction will generate higher national savings and lower 
interest rates, which are conducive to long-term growth. 
 
·   A larger budget surplus will reduce the burden on the Bank of Canada to 
control inflation, and 
 
·   Given the government’s determination to avoid deficits, a larger planned 
surplus provides a more adequate “cushion” against perverse fiscal  
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policies in the event of a recession, thereby permitting the automatic 
fiscal stabilizers to operate with full force. 
On balance, we view the debt reduction shown in Table 6 as appropriate, 
and therefore must subtract these amounts from the projected fiscal dividend 
of the base case. As noted above, the larger debt paydown in the early years 
entails more room to manoeuvre in the later years because of reduced debt-
servicing costs. 
When the planned debt paydowns are subtracted from the fiscal dividend 
we arrive at our estimates of the amount available for additional tax reduc-
tions (or spending increases). The room for additional tax cuts is small in the 
first two years, reflecting the priority of debt repayment. But this room 




A Medium-Term Tax Reduction Plan 
 
Given these projections, we believe that a medium-term tax reduction plan 
should be implemented. While reductions in personal income taxes will 
account for most of the reduction in tax revenues, it is important to include 
reductions in business taxes and payroll taxes in the tax reduction plan. As 
noted earlier, these are the taxes that have the strongest effects on efficiency 
and growth. 
Reductions in EI payroll taxes will help to offset the adverse transitional 
effects of CPP/QPP payroll tax increases on employment. We have therefore 
allowed for five successive annual 15¢ reductions in the employee contribu-
tion rate, starting January 1, 2001. In fiscal 2004–05 this measure will cost 
about $5.1 billion. 
A higher priority, from the standpoint of economic efficiency and growth, 
are reductions in business taxes. We believe that a significant reduc-tion in 
corporate taxes will facilitate the implementation of the recommenda-tions of 
the Technical Committee, as well as being desirable on their own. Following 
the February 2000 budget our tax reduction package therefore includes a 
seven percentage point reduction in the statutory rate for large non-
manufacturing firms, to be phased in over five years. This reduction is over 
and above the rate reductions that could be financed by base-broadening 
measures. Upon full implementation, the annual ex ante cost of this measure 
would be almost $3 billion dollars. However, as the Technical Committee 
noted, a reduction in statutory corporate rates will likely increase the 
corporate tax base, thereby reducing the revenue loss. This measure would 
reduce the combined federal/provincial rate to about 36 per cent. Further  
Taxes, Efficiency and Economic Growth                  125 
reductions could be made if the base-broadening reforms recommended by 
the committee were implemented. It should be possible to reduce the 
combined federal/provincial corporate rate to about 30 per cent without 
additional revenue losses. 
We also include a reduction in the capital gains inclusion rate from three-
quarters to two-thirds, in order to bring the typical top bracket marginal rate 
on realized capital gains in line with the effective marginal rate on dividends. 
This measure was implemented in the February 2000 budget.
16 The annual 
net revenue costs, which would begin in fiscal year 2000–01, would be about 
$0.3 billion per year on an ex ante basis. However, a reduction in capital 
gains taxes will likely stimulate realizations (Mintz and Wilson, 2000b) 
reducing the net revenue cost of this measure. 
When the payroll, business and capital gains tax reductions are deducted 
from the total tax room, we derive the amount available for personal income 
tax reductions. As shown in Table 7, there is considerable room for PIT 






Allocating the Fiscal Dividend: Economic Effects 
 
The current debate is about the allocation of the fiscal dividend. We have 
therefore chosen to model the economic effects of the particular combination 
of debt paydowns, spending increases and tax reductions described above 
relative to an alternative allocation. In the alternative, we have limited debt 
reduction to $3 billion per year, and have allocated all of the remaining 
potential surplus to non-taxable transfers to persons. This particular 
alternative was selected since it represented the base case used in the original 
fiscal dividend exercise. 
We then implemented our recommended package of debt reduction, 
spending increase and tax reductions, reducing non-taxable transfer pay-ments 
dollar for dollar to “finance” these initiatives. We set monetary policy to 
maintain the price level approximately unchanged when our fiscal dividend 
allocation package is introduced. 
 
 
                                                             
16The inclusion rate was further reduced to one-half in the October 2000 
Statement.  
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Notes:  *These are the expenditure increases announced in (or immediately before) 
             budget 2000 (including increases in the child tax benefit). 





The results are presented in Table 8. As is apparent, the package has 
favourable effects on employment, productivity and real output. The 
composition of demand is shifted from consumption to investment, net 
exports and real government purchases of goods and services. As the package 
exerts a deflationary impact on prices, monetary policy is eased, with lower 
interest rates and a lower exchange rate. With investment stronger, the capital 
stock gradually increases. The federal government surplus is increased 
directly as a result of our higher debt reduction targets, and indirectly because 
of lower interest rates and stronger economic growth. In the final year of the 
analysis, the federal debt-GDP ratio is reduced by 1.4 percentage points 
relative to the alternative. 
These economic and fiscal results in this illustrative simulation are due to 
three of the measures in our package. 
 
·   Higher debt paydowns, which provide more room for monetary easing; 
 
·   Business tax reductions, which stimulate investment; and 
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Table 8: Allocating the Fiscal Dividend: The TOTAL  
        Package Starting in 2000FY 
        (impacts are percentage changes unless otherwise indicated) 
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·   Payroll tax cuts, which put downward pressure on unit costs (i.e., they 
are like a favourable supply price shock), permitting stronger growth 
without inflation. 
 
The other components of the package — PIT cuts and increased govern-
ment spending on goods and services — have very similar aggregate effects 
as non-taxable transfers. These results therefore serve to underline the 
importance of debt reduction and cuts in business taxes and payroll taxes if 
economic growth and productivity are to be enhanced. 
The additional fiscal surplus generated by our recommended fiscal 
package is presented in Table 9. As shown, by fiscal year 2004–05 the 
federal surplus would be increased by about $1.1 billion. These additions to 
the surplus provide some insurance that debt reduction targets will be met. 
Alternatively, they can be viewed as providing the opportunity for additional 
fiscal initiatives in the later years of the projection. 
While large potential surpluses have focused public attention on tax 






























































aFrom Table 6, line 3. 
bFederal surplus reported in Table 8, plus the $3 billion Contingency 
Reserve. 
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broadening,
17 which could finance even larger reductions in tax rates, or 
additional measures to improve equity and efficiency. 
The macroeconomic analysis presented in this paper was carried out 
before the October 2000 Economic Statement and Budget Update. The 
additional PIT reductions announced in that statement would use up most of 
the estimated room for tax reductions shown in Table 6. On the other hand 
the federal budget surplus for fiscal 1999–2000 was $12.3 billion, about $9 
billion higher than estimated in budget 2000. The federal budget surplus for 
fiscal year 2000–01 is $17.1 billion, about $13 billion higher than planned in 
budget 2000. Unless this improved fiscal position was wholly explained by 
transitory factors, the large surplus would provide additional room for new 
fiscal initiatives. In any case, the reduction in debt-service costs generated by 
the large surpluses of those two years will provide additional fiscal room. 
Another factor clouding the picture is the deterioration of the near-term 
economic outlook in 2001. The slower growth experienced in the fourth 
quarter of 2000 and the first half of 2001 will likely reduce the federal surplus 
in fiscal 2001–02. However, the medium-term fiscal picture may not be 
significantly changed. 
While the quantitative estimates provided in this paper are clearly subject 
to revision, our qualitative conclusions are unlikely to be affected. 
Consequently, we still recommend that the federal government establish a 
task force to evaluate the personal income tax. Like the Technical 
Committee’s Report on Business Taxation, the report of this task force would 






                                                             
17Above we mentioned replacing the $500,000 exemption for farmers and CCPCs 
with expanded access to RRSPs. Other possible base-broadening measures include the 
taxation of certain employee benefits, the elimination of age and pension credits, and the 
taxation of lottery and gambling winnings. 
Our analysis suggests that the federal government should maintain its 
commitment to the five-year tax reduction plan and should implement this 
plan on a timely basis. While personal income tax cuts will take up most of 
the room for tax reductions, it is important to steadily reduce payroll and 
business taxes as well. Our simulations of a fiscal package involving 
significant debt reduction, modest spending increases and reductions in 
personal, business and payroll taxes, using the FOCUS macroeconometric 
model show that such a fiscal package should have favourable supply-side  
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effects on output, employment and productivity over the medium term. 
Finally, there are still important issues of tax structure that need to be 
addressed. Consequently, we recommend that the government establish a 
task force to review personal income taxes and to consider the need for 
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Notes: 1.  To single out the tax impact, we assumed that the interest rate and inflation rate are 6.8 per cent and 1.4 per cent respectively across 
countries and periods. 
2.  The Canadian METR for the service sector in 2001 is corresponding, respectively, to the federal CIT rate of 28.12 per cent (including 
the 4 per cent surtax), combined with the weighted average provincial CIT rate of 14.15 per cent.  
3.  The German METR for 2001 reflects the federal CIT reduction from the current 40 per cent to 25 per cent, starting in January 2001. 
The municipal trade tax (16.66 per cent on average) and the solidarity surcharge (5.5 per cent) will still apply. 
4.  The general CIT rate in Ireland was 32 per cent in 1996, 24 per cent in 2000 and 20 per cent in 2001. A lower rate of 10 per cent is 
applicable for manufacturing and the international tradable service sector (i.e., financial service sector), to which a corresponding METR 
of 4.2 per cent is shown in Case (1). Case (2) is for hotel services which is subject to the general CIT rate but enjoys a higher tax 
depreciation rate of 15 per cent for hotel buildings. Case (3) is for other services which subjects to the general CIT rate and tax 
depreciation allowance. 
 